

President Reagan

U.S. Program for Peace and Arms Control

November 18, 1981



United States Department of State
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Following is a speech by President Reagan before the National Press Club in Washington, D.C., November 18, 1981.

Back in April while in the hospital I had, as you can readily understand, a lot of time for reflection. And one day I decided to send a personal, hand-written letter to Soviet President Leonid Brezhnev reminding him that we had met about 10 years ago in San Clemente, California, as he and President Nixon were concluding a series of meetings that had brought hope to all the world. Never had peace and goodwill seemed closer at hand. I'd like to read you a few paragraphs from that letter.

Mr. President: When we met I asked if you were aware that the hopes and aspirations of millions of people throughout the world were dependent on the decisions that would be reached in those meetings. You took my hand in both of yours and assured me that you were aware of that and that you were dedicated with all your heart, and soul, and mind to fulfilling those hopes and dreams.

I went on in my letter to say:

The people of the world still share that hope. Indeed, the peoples of the world, despite differences in racial and ethnic origin, have very much in common. They want the dignity of having some control over their individual lives—their destiny. They want to work at the craft or trade of their own choosing and to be fairly rewarded. They want to raise their families in peace without harming anyone or suffering harm themselves. Government exists for their convenience, not the other way around.

If they are incapable, as some would have us believe, of self-government, then where among them do we find any who are capable of governing others? Is it possible that we have permitted ideology, political and economic philosophies, and governmental policies to keep us from considering the very real, everyday problems of our peoples? Will the average Soviet family be better off or even aware that the Soviet Union has imposed a government of its own choice on the people of Afghanistan? Is life better for the people of Cuba because the Cuban military dictate who shall govern the people of Angola?

It is often implied that such things have been made necessary because of territorial ambitions of the United States; that we have imperialistic designs and thus constitute a threat to your own security and that of the newly emerging nations. There not only is no evidence to support such a charge, there is solid evidence that the United States, when it could have dominated the world with no risk to itself, made no effort whatsoever to do so.

When World War II ended, the United States had the only undamaged industrial power in the world. Our military might was at its peak—and we alone had the ultimate weapon, the nuclear weapon, with the unquestioned ability to deliver it anywhere in the world. If we had sought world domination then, who could have opposed us?

But the United States followed a different course—one unique in all the history of mankind. We used our power and wealth to rebuild the war-ravaged economies of the world, including those nations who had been our enemies. May I say there is absolutely no substance to charges that the United States is guilty of imperialism or attempts to impose its will on other countries by use of force.

I concluded my letter by saying:

Mr. President, should we not be concerned with eliminating the obstacles which prevent our people—those you and I represent—from achieving their most cherished goals?

It's in the same spirit that I want to speak today to this audience, and the people of the world, about America's program for peace and the coming negotiations which begin November 30th in Geneva, Switzerland. Specifically, I want to present our program for preserving peace in Europe and our wider program for arms control.

Preserving Peace

Twice in my lifetime I have seen the peoples of Europe plunged into the tragedy of war. Twice in my lifetime Europe has suffered destruction and military occupation in wars that statesmen proved powerless to prevent, soldiers unable to contain, and ordinary citizens unable to escape. And twice in my lifetime, young Americans have bled their lives into the soil of those battlefields—not to enrich or enlarge our domain but to restore the peace and independence of our friends and allies.

All of us who lived through those troubled times share a common resolve that they must never come again. And most of us share a common appreciation of the Atlantic alliance that has made a peaceful, free, and prosperous Western Europe in the postwar era possible.

But today a new generation is emerging on both sides of the Atlantic. Its members were not present at the creation of the North Atlantic alliance. Many of them do not fully understand its roots in defending freedom and rebuilding a war-torn continent. Some young people question why we need weapons—particularly nuclear weapons—to deter war and to assure peaceful development. They fear that the accumulation of weapons itself may lead to conflagration. Some even propose unilateral disarmament.

I understand their concerns. Their questions deserve to be answered. But we have an obligation to answer their questions on the basis of judgment and reason and experience. Our policies have resulted in the longest European peace in this century. Would not a rash departure from these policies, as some now suggest, endanger that peace? From its founding, the Atlantic alliance has preserved the peace through unity, deterrence, and dialogue.

First, we and our allies have stood united by the firm commitment that an attack upon any one of us would be considered an attack upon us all;

Second, we and our allies have deterred aggression by maintaining forces strong enough to insure that any aggressor would lose more from an attack than he could possibly gain; and

Third, we and our allies have engaged the Soviets in a dialogue about mutual restraint and arms limitations, hoping to reduce the risk of war and the burden of armaments and to lower the barriers that divide East from West.

These three elements of our policy have preserved the peace in Europe for more than a third of a century. They can preserve it for generations to come, so long as we pursue them with sufficient will and vigor.

Today, I wish to reaffirm America's commitment to the Atlantic alliance and our resolve to sustain the peace. And from my conversations with allied leaders, I know that they also remain true to this tried and proven course. NATO's policy of peace is based on restraint and balance. No NATO weapons, conventional or nuclear, will ever be used in Europe except in response to attack. NATO's defense plans have been responsible and restrained. The allies remain strong, united, and resolute. But the momentum of the continuing Soviet military buildup threatens both the conventional and the nuclear balance. Consider the facts over the past decade:

- The United States reduced the size of its armed forces and decreased its military spending. The Soviets steadily increased the number of men under arms. They now number more than double those of the United States. Over the same period the Soviets expanded their real military spending by about one-third.

- The Soviet Union increased its inventory of tanks to some 50,000 compared to our 11,000. Historically a land-power, they transformed their navy from a coastal defense force to an open ocean fleet, while the United States, a seapower with transoceanic alliances, cut its fleet in half.

- During a period when NATO deployed no new intermediate-range nuclear missiles and actually withdrew 1,000 nuclear warheads, the Soviet Union deployed more than 750 nuclear

warheads on the new SS-20 missiles alone.

Our response to this relentless buildup of Soviet military power has been restrained but firm. We have made decisions to strengthen all three legs of the strategic triad—sea-, land-, and air-based. We have proposed a defense program in the United States for the next 5 years which will remedy the neglect of the past decade and restore the eroding balance on which our security depends.

I would like to discuss more specifically the growing threat to Western Europe which is posed by the continuing deployment of certain Soviet intermediate-range nuclear missiles. The Soviet Union has three different types of such missile systems—the SS-20, the SS-4, and the SS-5—all with a range capable of reaching virtually all of Western Europe. There are other Soviet weapons systems which also represent a major threat. The only answer to these systems is a comparable threat to Soviet targets. In other words, a deterrent preventing the use of these Soviet weapons by the counterthreat of a like response against their own territory.

At present, however, there is no equivalent deterrent to these Soviet intermediate missiles. And the Soviets continue to add one new SS-20 a week. To counter this, the allies agreed in 1979, as part of a two-track decision, to deploy as a deterrent land-based cruise missiles and Pershing II missiles capable of reaching targets in the Soviet Union. These missiles are to be deployed in several countries of Western Europe.

This relatively limited force in no way serves as a substitute for the much larger strategic umbrella spread over our NATO allies. Rather, it provides a vital link between conventional, shorter range nuclear forces in Europe and intercontinental forces in the United States. Deployment of these systems will demonstrate to the Soviet Union that this link cannot be broken.

Detering war depends on the perceived ability of our forces to perform effectively. The more effective our forces are, the less likely it is that we'll have to use them. So, we and our allies are proceeding to modernize NATO's nuclear forces of intermediate range to meet increased Soviet deployments of nuclear systems threatening Western Europe.

Arms Control Negotiations

Let me turn now to our hopes for arms control negotiations. There is a tendency to make this entire subject overly complex. I want to be clear and concise. I told you of the letter I wrote to President Brezhnev last April. Well, I've just sent another message to the Soviet leadership. It's a simple, straightforward, yet historic message: The United States proposes the mutual reduction of conventional, intermediate-range nuclear and strategic forces. Specifically, I have proposed a four-point agenda to achieve this objective in my letter to President Brezhnev.

The first, and most important, point concerns the Geneva negotiations. As part of the 1979 two-track decision, NATO made a commitment to seek arms control negotiations with the


Soviet Union on intermediate-range nuclear forces. The United States has been preparing for these negotiations through close consultation with our NATO partners. We are now ready to set forth our proposal. I have informed President Brezhnev that when our delegation travels to the negotiations on intermediate-range land-based nuclear missiles in Geneva on the 30th of this month, my representatives will present the following proposal: The United States is prepared to cancel its deployment of Pershing II and ground-launched cruise missiles if the Soviets will dismantle their SS-20, SS-4, and SS-5 missiles. This would be an historic step. With Soviet agreement, we could together substantially reduce the dread threat of nuclear war which hangs over the people of Europe. This, like the first

footstep on the moon, would be a giant step for mankind.

We intend to negotiate in good faith and go to Geneva willing to listen to and consider the proposals of our Soviet counterparts. But let me call to your attention the background against which our proposal is made. During the past 6 years, while the United States deployed no new intermediate-range missiles and withdrew 1,000 nuclear warheads from Europe, the Soviet Union deployed 750 warheads on mobile, accurate ballistic missiles. They now have 1,100 warheads on the SS-20, SS-4, and SS-5 missiles, and the United States has no comparable missiles. Indeed, the United States dismantled the last such missile in Europe over 15 years ago.

As we look to the future of the negotiations, it is also important to ad-

Coverage of Europe From SS-20 Bases East of the Urals



dress certain Soviet claims which, left unrefuted, could become critical barriers to real progress in arms control. The Soviets assert that a balance of intermediate-range nuclear forces already exists. That assertion is wrong. By any objective measure, as this chart indicates [see below], the Soviet Union has an overwhelming advantage, on the order of six to one.

Soviet spokesmen have suggested that moving their SS-20s beyond the Ural Mountains will remove the threat to Europe. As this map demonstrates, the SS-20s, even if deployed behind the Urals, will have a range that places almost all of Western Europe, the great cities, Rome, Athens, Paris, London, Brussels, Amsterdam, Berlin, and so many more; all of Scandinavia; all of the Middle East; all of northern Africa—all within range of these missiles, which incidentally are mobile and can be moved on shorter notice.

The second proposal I've made to President Brezhnev concerns strategic weapons. The United States proposes to open negotiations on strategic arms as soon as possible next year. I have instructed Secretary Haig to discuss the timing of such meetings with Soviet representatives.

Substance, however, is far more important than timing. As our proposal for the Geneva talks this month illustrates, we can make proposals for genuinely serious reductions but only if we take the time to prepare carefully. The United States has been preparing carefully for resumption of strategic arms negotiations because we do not want a repetition of past disappointments. We don't want an arms control process that sends hopes soaring only to end in dashed expectations.

I have informed President Brezhnev that we will seek to negotiate substantial reductions in nuclear arms which would result in levels that are equal and verifiable. Our approach to verification will be to emphasize openness and creativity—rather than the secrecy and suspicion which have undermined confidence in arms control in the past.

While we can hope to benefit from work done over the past decade in strategic arms negotiations, let us agree to do more than simply begin where these previous efforts left off. We can and should attempt major qualitative and quantitative progress. Only such progress can fulfill the hopes of our own people and the rest of the world. And let us see how far we can go in achieving


truly substantial reductions in our strategic arsenals. To symbolize this fundamental change in direction, we will call these negotiations START—Strategic Arms Reduction Talks.

The third proposal I have made to the Soviet Union is that we act to achieve equality at lower levels of conventional forces in Europe. The defense needs of the Soviet Union hardly call for maintaining more combat divisions in East Germany today than were in the whole Allied invasion force that landed in Normandy on D-day. The Soviet Union could make no more convincing contribution to peace in Europe—and in the world—than by agreeing to reduce its conventional forces significantly and constrain the potential for sudden aggression.

Finally, I have pointed out to President Brezhnev that to maintain peace, we must reduce the risks of surprise attack and the chance of war arising out of uncertainty or miscalculation. I am renewing our proposal for a conference to develop effective measures that would reduce these dangers. At the current Madrid meeting of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, we are laying the foundation for a Western-proposed conference on disarmament in Europe. This conference would discuss new measures to enhance stability and security in Europe. Agreement on this conference is within reach. I urge the Soviet Union to join us and many other nations who are ready to launch this important enterprise.

All of these proposals are based on the same fair-minded principles: substantial, militarily significant reduction in forces; equal ceilings for similar types of forces; and adequate provisions for verification. My Administration, our country, and I are committed to achieving arms reduction agreements based on these principles. Today I have outlined the kinds of bold, equitable proposals which the world expects of us. But we cannot reduce arms unilaterally. Success can only come if the Soviet Union will share our commitment; if it will demonstrate that its often-repeated professions of concern for peace will be matched by positive action.

Balance of Comparable US and Soviet Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces



Key Intermediate-Range Land-Based Missiles

Soviet

US

Type	Warheads per Missile	Number of Launchers Deployed	Total Warheads on Launchers	Range (km)	Total Warheads on Launchers	Number of Launchers Deployed	Warheads per Missile	Type
SS-20	3	250	750	4,400 to 5,000		—		—
SS-5	1	35	35	4,100		—		—
—				2,500	0 (464 planned)	0 (116 launchers, 4 missiles per launcher planned)	1	Ground-launched cruise missile
SS-4	1	315	315	1,900		—		—
—				1,800	0 (108 planned)	0 (108 planned)	1	Pershing II
Total		600	1,100		0 (572 planned)	0 (224 planned)		Total

U.S. Concept of Peace

Preservation of peace in Europe and the pursuit of arms reduction talks are of fundamental importance. But we must also help to bring peace and security to regions now torn by conflict, external intervention, and war.

The American concept of peace goes well beyond the absence of war. We foresee a flowering of economic growth and individual liberty in a world at peace. At the economic summit conference in Cancun, I met with the leaders of 21 nations and sketched out our approach to global economic growth. We want to eliminate the barriers to trade and investment which hinder these critical incentives to growth. And we're working to develop new programs to help the poorest nations achieve self-sustaining growth.

And terms like "peace" and "security," we have to say, have little meaning for the oppressed and the destitute. They also mean little to the individual

whose state has stripped him of human freedom and dignity. Wherever there is oppression, we must strive for the peace and security of individuals as well as states. We must recognize that progress in the pursuit of liberty is a necessary complement to military security. Nowhere has this fundamental truth been more boldly and clearly stated than in the Helsinki accords of 1975. These accords have not yet been translated into living reality.

Today I have announced an agenda that can help to achieve peace, security, and freedom across the globe. In particular, I have made an important offer to forego entirely deployment of new American missiles in Europe if the Soviet Union is prepared to respond on an equal footing.

There is no reason why people in any part of the world should have to live in permanent fear of war or its specter. I believe the time has come for all nations to act in a responsible spirit that doesn't threaten other states. I believe

the time is right to move forward on arms control and the resolution of critical regional disputes at the conference table. Nothing will have a higher priority for me and for the American people over the coming months and years.

Addressing the United Nations 20 years ago, another American President described the goal we still pursue today. He said, "If we all can persevere, if we can . . . look beyond our own shores and ambitions, then surely the age will dawn in which the strong are just and the weak secure and the peace preserved." He didn't live to see that goal achieved.

I invite all nations to join with America today in the quest for such a world. ■

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Prospects for Arms Control

October 21, 1981



United States Department of State
Bureau of Public Affairs
Washington, D.C.

Following is a statement by Eugene V. Rostow, Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency before Committee I of the U.N. General Assembly in New York, October 21, 1981.

It is a privilege for me to address Committee I [Political and Security] of the General Assembly in order to present the views of my government on arms control and disarmament, both the major items on the arms control agenda of the United Nations, and some related problems as well. If you will permit me a personal note, I have long been involved in U.N. affairs. I served in the Secretariat years ago and look back to that experience with pride. And a considerable part of my scholarly work has been devoted to the study of the United Nations as a peacekeeping institution.

The people and Government of the United States have always viewed the Charter and the institutions of the United Nations as critically important elements of the world political system. The American people know that the United Nations is part of the skeleton and the central nervous system of world politics. And they look to it with hope. The charter embodies an agreed code of values which define the necessary terms of international cooperation—the rules which should guide and animate the behavior of states and unite the members of the United Nations, for all their differences, into a single society and polity. The code of the charter has grown out of nearly 200 years of trial and error in the long struggle of the enlightenment to conquer or at least

tame the aggressive instincts of man. If the charter rules—and especially its rule dealing with the international use of force—should finally disappear as an influence on the behavior of states, world public order would collapse into anarchy and general war would inevitably ensue.

Committee I is the designated forum for discussions of arms control, disarmament, and international security issues. Its authority derives not only from its mandate but from the distinction of its past achievements. It is, surely, the premier forum in which the nations can consider what they should do to lift the crushing burden of arms and the threat of war from the backs and minds of their people.

The United States approaches the problems of arms control not as isolated abstractions but as components of the larger problem of international security and stability. After all, arms control initiatives are meaningless unless they are viewed as aspects of a comprehensive strategy to achieve and to maintain peace.

The traditional discussion of many hardy perennials on the U.N. arms control agenda often has an air of unreality, to say the least. The reason for this tone of unworldliness at the United Nations is that it has become a habit among us not to talk about the central issues in any examination of the problem of peace—the declining influence of Article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter on the behavior of states. The charter says, and I quote,

All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.

The last two decades have witnessed a rising tide of threats to the peace, breaches of the peace, and aggressions—actions which involved the use or the threat of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of states. Far too often, in the United Nations and elsewhere, we write and talk as if peace could be secured through the adoption of an aseptic formula for limiting or abolishing nuclear tests or controlling international arms transfers or declaring our undying faith in the principles of universal disarmament. We make such speeches and draft such resolutions while the manufacture of arms sets new records every year as the leading growth industry throughout the world, while state after state around the world is under threat or under attack, while unprovoked invasions occur without even the pretense of the excuse of self-defense, and while armed bands and terrorists cross international frontiers to assault the political independence of states.

As the fever of aggression spreads, the world community does less and less to vindicate the basic principle of article 2(4), the principle of the equality and integrity of all states, the rock on which the charter and the state system rest. As a distinguished American scholar has commented, the world community now treats such events with a "normative silence" which is "deafening" and ominous. As a result, more and more states live in fear and trembling. They turn to arms, even to nuclear arms, to assure their survival. Somehow or other they find arms, despite our rules.

Unless we confront these facts and restore general and reciprocal respect for the principles of Article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter, the slide toward anarchy will engulf us all. Achieving peace is not a simple matter to be settled on the cheap and without tears. Peace requires more than the drafting of treaties and resolutions, however worthy. Until we take effective steps to see to it that the charter, the arms control treaties, and the legally binding decisions of the Security Council are obeyed; until we can verify and assure compliance with their terms, much of what passes for arms control will be a sterile exercise at best and often, alas, no more than a charade.

My first point today, therefore, is to assure you that in this forum and in all other fora my government will urge that

we examine the problems of arms control and disarmament on our agenda in the full light of reality. To that end, we shall propose and support a series of initiatives designed to focus attention systematically on the principal problems of establishing peace.

Soviet Expansionism

The underlying cause of the declining influence of article 2(4) in world affairs, and the corresponding eclipse of arms control, is the expansionist policy of the Soviet Union and the extraordinary military buildup on which it is based. The Soviet Union does not initiate all the turbulence in the world. A great deal occurs because of other factors. What the Soviet Union does is to exploit and manipulate regional turbulence in the interest of enlarging its own sphere of dominance.

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I make this comment not to engage in idle polemics but simply to state a self-evident fact known to everyone in this room. It is a fact of critical importance, which is fundamental to the decisions which my government has had to take and which other governments are taking as well—decisions to restore the balance of power, to deepen the solidarity of our alliances and other friendly relations of security cooperation, and to allow the community of nations to live in peace. In our relations with the Soviet Union, we must insist on the only possible rule of true detente—that of scrupulous and reciprocal respect for the provisions of the U.N. Charter regarding the international use of force.

Over the past decade, the world has endured the shock of the Soviet Union's accelerating drive for dominance, based upon an extraordinary allocation of its resources for military purpose. That drive is a clear and present danger to world peace and human freedom.

The goal of the Soviet Union's military buildup is to attain military superiority, superiority in both the destructive power of its nuclear forces and in the global reach of its conventional forces. As the British and American Governments pointed out some years ago, and as all the independent studies of the subject agree, the

Soviet buildup cannot be explained solely in terms of defense, however broadly the concept of defense is interpreted. The record speaks for itself.

Soviet expansionism is aimed at destroying the world balance of forces on which the survival of freedom depends. This drive is being carried on by methods openly in violation of the principles of the U.N. Charter. The instabilities thus created have impelled many developing nations to seek and acquire weapons with which to protect their perceived national interests.

Thus far, I have recalled for you only the visible manifestations of the Soviet drive for power in the Third World—its quest for client states and strategic positions, and its tendency to take advantage of every opportunity to enlarge its domain by the use of proxy forces, military assistance, subversion, or terrorism.

I should now say a few words about the issue of nuclear arms and nuclear arms control which are at the center of Soviet strategic doctrine. The United States views the effort to bring the nuclear weapon under international control as the most important task of those who seek to realize the promise of peace. Without success in this effort, no other success in the field of arms control will be possible.

A basic dilemma has haunted nuclear arms control negotiations from their beginning. For many years the United States assumed that the Soviet Union shared its view that the objective of arms control negotiations should be to allow each side the same right to maintain deterrence, a retaliatory capacity, and stability.

There have been occasions where East and West have had the same approach to an arms control problem, for example, on the question of nuclear weapons proliferation. The Nonproliferation Treaty of 1968 demonstrated how real gains in security can result when the Soviet Union recognizes its fundamental national interest in the stability of the state system. It is no longer possible to assume a mutuality of interest. The United States and the Soviet Union have different policies with regard to nuclear and conventional weapons. Therefore, they have different objectives in negotiating to limit the spiral of nuclear and conventional arms accumulation.

SALT [Strategic Arms Limitation Talks] is a case in point. U.S. nuclear doctrine is clear. Our goals are deterrence and stability. Our nuclear arsenal exists to make certain that neither the Soviet Union nor any other country can use or threaten to use nuclear weapons

for aggressive purposes or threaten the ultimate interests of the United States by any other means. Our purpose is to maintain a credible second-strike nuclear capability so that the United States, its allies, and its other interests are protected at all times. Facing an assured American second-strike capability, no potential nuclear aggressor will feel free to use military force against the United States, our NATO allies, the nations of the Western Hemisphere, Japan, or any other strategically critical nation. And we could not be deterred from using conventional force in defense of our interests if it became necessary to do so. This is and must remain the goal of our nuclear arsenal and, therefore, our minimal goal in nuclear arms control negotiations.

The Soviet Union has not yet adopted a parallel position. On the contrary, the mission of its nuclear forces is intimidation and coercion and, if necessary, victory in nuclear war. I need not recite the list of the new weapons deployed by the Soviets in the last 10 years. The Soviet Union has been and is still adding ICBMs [intercontinental ballistic missiles], large medium-range missiles, and nuclear-weapons submarines and bombers to its arsenal in an obvious effort to create and maintain a nuclear advantage.

The Soviet strategic buildup is aimed not at achieving and preserving strategic stability but at creating and aggravating strategic instability. Soviet strategic programs are designed to threaten the survivability of our strategic forces. This emphasis in Soviet military doctrine and action is in itself a repudiation of the doctrine of mutual assured destruction resting on mutual vulnerability, which many Americans thought both sides had adopted in 1972. The Soviet lead in heavy and accurate ICBMs, capable of destroying a large part of our ICBM force in a first strike, undermines the basis for stability and reciprocal restraint in a crisis. Such a situation is a recipe for nuclear blackmail. We cannot emphasize too often that the principal danger facing the world is not nuclear war but political coercion based on the credible threat of nuclear war.

In this situation, what is the position of my government toward arms control negotiations with the Soviet Union? The profound changes in the strategic environment since 1972 have required the United States to review its arms control policies, which have failed, and to devise new policies adapted to the world as it now is. That process of review is proceeding rapidly and at a high level.

Apart from these indispensable preparations and the intellectual effort they require, the United States has established no preconditions for arms control negotiations with the Soviet Union. We are not waiting for a military balance to be restored before we parlay with the Soviet Union. And we are setting no political condition, either, despite our deepest concern regarding the Soviet Union's invasion of Afghanistan and its expansionist activities in other parts of the world.

The United States is, of course, taking steps to restore its deterrent capability, both nuclear and conventional. These steps are indispensable in themselves from the point of view of security. In the world or reality, fair and balanced arms control agreements would be inconceivable without a firm American commitment to maintain a credible deterrent.

We shall be seeking arms reductions and arms control agreements which would insure an equal deterrent capacity for both sides at lower levels of armament and which would require both parties to cooperate in assuring compliance.

We have already begun the first phase of substantive talks on nuclear arms control issues with the Soviet Union. In August we proposed informal talks on problems of verifying compliance with arms control agreements, on the provision of data, and on certain other general subjects which would arise in arms control negotiations. We told the Soviet Union that we thought cooperative procedures would be necessary to supplement national technical means in a number of areas and invited Soviet ideas about how best to proceed—through diplomatic channels, through special meetings of experts, or through the negotiations themselves. We have not yet had a response to this proposal.

U.S.-Soviet negotiation on intermediate-range nuclear forces will begin in a few weeks on November 30. We welcome the commencement of these talks. We expect to be ready to propose that the companion talks on the reduction of strategic nuclear forces should begin early in 1982.

Arms Control Verification

I should now like to turn to the specific subjects under discussion in this committee and at the Committee on Disarmament. Let me state at the outset that the United States Government is strongly committed to the work of the Committee on Disarmament. I intend, despite the demands of the nuclear arms problem, to take a sustained personal in-

terest in the matters to be discussed here and in Geneva. I expect during the months ahead that the United States will propose a number of initiatives in the Committee on Disarmament, in order to take full advantage of the committee's capacity for seriously considered and deliberate action.

One area in which we hope and expect this committee and the Committee on Disarmament to take a strong lead is in addressing the questions of monitoring and verifying compliance with arms control agreements, new and old. New procedures are needed to make verification processes more thorough and more reliable. The cause of peace cannot be advanced if the nations have little confidence that arms control agreements are being complied with. In certain areas—those concerned with nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons, for example—compliance can be quite literally a matter of life and death. No nation can be expected to respect an arms control agreement unless it can be sure that other signatories are complying with it.

In this perspective, I should mention the use of lethal and incapacitant chemical agents in Southeast Asia, Afghanistan, and elsewhere. This is a matter of deep and continuing concern to my government. The use of chemical agents and toxins in Southeast Asia makes clear the need for concrete international action to restore confidence in the 1925 Geneva Protocol [Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare], the Biological Weapons Convention, and associated rules of customary international law.

The United States supported U.N. General Assembly Resolution 35/144C which initiated the ongoing experts investigation of reports on the use of chemical weapons. We regret that some nations felt obliged to oppose it. We do not understand such opposition. The new evidence concerning the use of toxins makes the work of the experts group all the more important. My government looks forward to the findings of the experts group in light of all the evidence before it, including the new evidence.

This issue is a matter of critical importance in many dimensions. It requires the full attention of this committee and of the General Assembly, both because of the implications for the relevant international prohibitions on the possession and use of such weapons and because of the broader issues raised by their use. People are dying. This is not an East-West issue, nor is it a North-South

issue. Rather, it is an issue which concerns the security—present and future—of all nations alike. Once more such weapons are being used—weapons regarded with loathing and revulsion throughout the world. These weapons are not being used on animals but on human beings in small defenseless countries. If the nations are not willing or able to take concrete and effective actions to deal with this problem and enforce compliance with the 1925 Geneva Protocol and the biological weapons conventions, then the prospects for any arms control initiative will be seriously undermined.

I wish to emphasize two of the principles which will guide our thinking on problems of verification in both bilateral and multilateral agreements.

First, we shall not confine ourselves to negotiating only about those aspects of a problem which can be resolved by resorting to national technical means. In the case of the negotiations with the Soviet Union, we shall begin by offering substantial limitations that are strategically significant and then construct the set of measures necessary to insure verifiability. These may well include cooperative procedures between the United States and the Soviet Union, such as detailed data exchanges and provisions to enhance the confidence of each side in data obtained by national technical means.

Second, we shall seek verification provisions which not only insure that actual threats to our security resulting from possible violations can be detected in a timely manner but also limit the likelihood of ambiguous situations developing. Ambiguity can never be eliminated entirely from documents drafted by people, but we shall do our best to keep it to a minimum. Ambiguous provisions result in compliance questions and compliance questions lead to compliance complaints which, even if ultimately resolved, strain the atmosphere for arms control negotiations.

Given the importance of verification for the viability of arms control across the board, Soviet acceptance of cooperative measures to improve the verifiability of specific limitations may be the best test of its commitment to serious arms limitations on both a bilateral and multilateral basis.

Nuclear Nonproliferation

Let me now turn to the important issue of nuclear nonproliferation. The position of the United States is clear. President Reagan has identified this problem as one of the most critical challenges faced

by the world community. It is the premise of the Nonproliferation Treaty that a halt to the proliferation of nuclear weapons serves the interests of all countries, nuclear and non-nuclear alike. It is manifest that, in a world where many nations have nuclear weapons, international politics would be nearly unpredictable and volatile to the point of explosiveness. President Reagan has recognized that political instability can be a cause as well as a consequence of nuclear proliferation. He has pointed out that global and regional stabilization are necessary—but not sufficient—conditions for success in the effort to carry out the policies of the Nonproliferation Treaty. In addition, both supplier and consumer nations must work together to insure that peaceful nuclear cooperation, an essential factor in meeting global energy needs, is not misused.

In the context of regional approaches to nonproliferation, I am pleased to announce that the Senate Foreign Relations Committee has favorably reported Protocol I of the Treaty of Tlatelolco, and the Senate is expected shortly to give its advice and consent for ratification. President Reagan will, I am sure, move promptly to deposit our instrument of ratification. This treaty was a farsighted initiative of Latin American countries that has contributed significantly to hemispheric security. While the regime envisaged by the treaty is not yet complete, we hope all nations in the region will make every effort to insure the full success of this important achievement.

Committee I has on its agenda items relating to establishing other nuclear-free zones. The U.S. Government has taken a keen interest in supporting the Egyptian initiative to establish a Middle Eastern nuclear-weapons-free zone. The proposal has great promise, which can be realized only if the states of the region work together to fulfill it. Many problems will have to be solved by those states before the dream of the Middle East as a nuclear-weapons-free zone can become a reality. The United States stands ready to assist the states of the region, if they wish such assistance, in studying these thorny issues and in resolving them. We hope that this General Assembly will encourage the project and give it further impetus.

The United States is prepared to participate constructively in the work of the Committee on Disarmament with a view to concluding successfully the negotiation of a convention prohibiting radiological weapons. We also believe that the important work of that body in the area of chemical weapons should be continued.

Halting nuclear tests has been an issue before this committee, the Committee on Disarmament, and its predecessors for many years. High hopes have been attached to the proposal, and no one can question the goal it is designed eventually to achieve. Of course, the U.S. Government supports that long-term goal. But a test ban cannot, of itself, end the threat posed by nuclear weapons. We shall cooperate fully in appropriate procedures to examine the problems the proposal presents. However, international conditions have not been propitious and are not now propitious for immediate action on this worthy project.

As we consider the question of a nuclear test ban, we should keep in mind that in order for such a ban ultimately to be effective, it must be verifiable. And it must be concluded under conditions which insure that it would enhance rather than diminish international security and stability.

The committee is discussing the possibility of further arms control measures for outer space, a question which the Committee on Disarmament might wish to discuss further. The United States has supported efforts to control arms in space in the past through such major international agreements as the outer space treaty and the Limited Test Ban Treaty. Moreover, U.S. military use of space has been non-aggressive in nature and has been conducted with great restraint. Further steps in space arms control are greatly complicated by the fact that the Soviet Union has for many years been testing an antisatellite weapon—a space system designed for the sole purpose of attacking other nations' satellites—and maintains a continuing operational capacity to use this weapon.

As Committee I conducts its work, it is important to keep in mind that pious rhetoric and vacuous resolutions do not constitute arms control. Moreover, the United States is firmly opposed to allowing arms control negotiations, which are the most serious issue any nation can address, to be abused for purposes of political warfare. The serious effort to deal with matters of concern to this body or the specialized agencies of the United Nations must not become the victim of political disputes which can be considered on their merits in the appropriate U.N. bodies. I hope that members of this committee will reject propaganda resolutions which tend so often to frustrate our deliberations about serious issues. This would provide a better at-

mosphere next year for the second special session of the U.N. General Assembly devoted to disarmament. I want to emphasize the strong support of the U.S. Government for the special session and pledge our cooperation to insure its success.

Prospects for Progress

Let me conclude by returning to the theme with which I began—that arms control is not a magic formula through which differing views of the international scene can be reconciled. Without fundamental agreement on the basic premises which underlie the U.N. Charter, the prospects for substantial progress in arms control will be dim indeed. Limitations on nuclear arms will not have much chance of success until the Soviet Union accepts the view that it too must abide by article 2(4). This century—bloody as it has been—has, in most areas of the world, seen the rise of a state system in which self-determination and a tolerance of different political and social systems have become the norm. Most dreams of militarism, empire, and expansionism have been abandoned. The great question which remains to be answered is whether the last remaining traditional colonial empire is prepared to join with the rest of us in seeking the newer and better world order anticipated by our charter.

In the nuclear age there can be no doubt that peace is indivisible. The world community cannot and will not long accept a double standard, as President Reagan has pointed out. We in the West have been patient, and we are slow to anger. But no one should take our patience for blindness or passivity. Secretary of State Haig summed up the position of the United States a few months ago in these terms:


What do we want of the Soviet Union? We want greater Soviet restraint in the use of force. We want greater Soviet respect for the independence of others. And we want the Soviets to abide by their reciprocal obligations, such as those undertaken in the Helsinki accords. These are no more than we demand of any state, and these are no less than are required by the U.N. Charter and international law. The rules of the charter governing the international use of force will lose all of their influence on the behavior of nations if the Soviet Union continues its aggressive course.

The United States and the Soviet Union, possessing very large nuclear forces, are locked into an extraordinary relationship. In a famous article, it was once characterized as the relationship between two scorpions in a bottle. I prefer another metaphor.

There are marriages of love and marriages of convenience. There are also marriages of necessity. The Soviet policy of expansion, fueled by the extraordinary growth of the Soviet armed forces and particularly of its nuclear forces, has produced a situation of growing tension and instability in the world political system. The efforts of the Soviet Union to split the West and to prevent Western improvement of its defenses will surely fail. As a consequence, the Soviet Union should join the United States and its allies and accept the necessity of cooperation as the only way out of the dilemma both camps now confront. Only on that footing can they hope to achieve conditions of peaceful coexistence, as Secretary of State Haig defined the concept in the speech from which I have just quoted.

As President Reagan sees it, the bilateral nuclear arms control negotiations which have already begun—and which will soon enter their more formal stage in Geneva—should, if successful, be a long step toward the goal of restoring world public order. Our work here and in the Committee on Disarmament is equally important and, if conducted in a spirit of realism, can also contribute greatly to that end. ■

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CAMBRIDGE, MASS.

Mr. Paul E. Healy
City Clerk
City of Cambridge
City Hall
Cambridge, Massachusetts 02139

Dear Mr. Healy:

Ms. Higgins at the White House has sent us a copy of the resolution regarding arms control adopted by your City Council.

We want to be as sensitive to public opinion as possible in the conduct of U.S. foreign policy and appreciate the special effort you made to share your views with the Administration.

The United States is actively engaged in preparations for the special session, which will begin on June 7. In conjunction with our participation in the United Nations Committee on Disarmament we are involved in the talks on several arms control initiatives which will be discussed further at SSOD II. These include a comprehensive program for disarmament, a radiological weapons treaty, and efforts to bring other weapons of mass destruction under greater control. In late April we will participate in the final meeting of the Preparatory committee for the special session.

The SSOD II conference is an important forum for multi-lateral consideration of arms control and disarmament questions. It also complements bilateral U.S.-Soviet negotiations such as the ongoing intermediate-range nuclear forces (INF) talks and the proposed Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START) announced by President Reagan in November.

The U.S. Government supports realistic, effective, balanced, and verifiable arms control measures. We must recognize that such measures cannot be considered in isolation from world events. The Soviet military occupation of Afghanistan, the Vietnamese invasion of Kampuchea, the illegal use of chemical weapons in Southeast Asia and Afghanistan, and the current repression in Poland are all examples of developments which complicate the climate for disarmament negotiations. There will be no quick or easy solutions, but we are dedicated to progress.

I am sending the enclosed material in the belief that you will find it of interest.

Sincerely,

Dean E Fischer

Dean E. Fischer
Assistant Secretary
for Public Affairs and
Department Spokesman

Enclosures.

S-356

Comm. from Paul E. Healy, City Clerk, transmitting a comm. from Dean E. Fischer, Asst. Secretary for Public Affairs & Spokesman for the U.S. State Dept. Re: strategic arms control initiatives.

In City Council,

April 12, 1982

4/12/82

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