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## Senate

### INSTEAD, WE ARE TALKING ABOUT WAR

**Mr. KERRY.** Mr. President, I wish, like everyone else here, that we were not at this moment talking about sending people to another war. Like many of us, I suspect, I had hoped after my reelection, and given the economic problems that we face in Massachusetts, to be able to return here and to talk about what we need to do to move our economy, to talk about economic priorities, about education, and the crime in our streets, and about the plain and simple anxiety that thousands of our citizens feel today just about survival at home.

Instead, Mr. President, we are talking about war, about countless of our families torn apart by duty and commitment to our country, of countless lives put on hold.

Mr. President, we are here talking about all of the repercussions that go with a war, about countless lives that will be put on hold. And surely the consequences of this discussion can make our domestic concerns even greater than they are today. But that is not the issue. That is not what we are here to talk about.

We engage here in one of the most important debates that we could ever engage in. And it is certainly the most important debate that I have engaged in since I have been in the U.S. Senate. And this will be the most important vote.

There has been a lot of talk on the floor about treaties, resolutions, principles, slogans, and all the political and strategic reasons for going to war or not going to war, and they are indeed a legitimate part of this debate.

But sometimes I think in the words we lose sight of the personal stakes of this conflict and what it will really mean to us at home—and to the rest of the world.

We have a way of quietly saying "war is hell" or "war is horrible" and then we move on, lost again in the words which describe the passions and the politics. I am willing to accept the horror that goes with war—when the interests or stakes warrant it. My belief is though that our impatience with sanctions and diplomacy does not

yet warrant accepting that horror and my fear is that our beloved country is not yet ready for what it will witness and bear if we go to war.

The question of being ready and certain is important to many of us of the Vietnam generation. We come to this debate with a measure of distrust, with some skepticism, with a searing commitment to ask honest questions and with a resolve to get satisfactory answers so that we are not misled again.

I might add that I also come to this debate determined that whatever happens we will not confuse a war with the warriors. I am determined that our troops will receive complete and total support. And, that if we do go to war, I am committed that we do everything in our power to accomplish our mission with minimum casualties and bring the troops home to the gratitude and respect they deserve.

But until the first shot is fired I remain troubled by the unanswered questions and by the human considerations.

Our VA hospitals are already full of several generations of veterans who carry or wear daily reminders of the costs of war. Those hospitals have been cutting staff and services these past several years. They cannot care for those already needing help. So, are we ready to spend the money on a new generation of patients? And can we afford to?

In a country that still struggles with agent orange, outreach centers, post-traumatic stress disorder, homeless veterans—is this country ready for the next wave?

I remind my colleagues that cost in human lives is not limited to the battlefield. In the case of Vietnam—we have lost more Vietnam Veterans from suicide and slower forms of suicide such as alcoholism and drug abuse that have had the same end-result of death, than we lost in battle—60,000 of them. The human costs, pain, and suffering do not end when combat ends. Are we ready?

Are we ready for the changes this war will bring—changes in sons and daughters who return from combat

never the same, some not knowing their families and their families not even recognizing them. Are we ready?

Are we ready for another generation of amputees, paraplegics, burn victims, and whatever the new desert war term will be for combat fatigue, shell shock, or PTSD?

Since the time of Vietnam we have been reaching for a set of ruling principles about when we go to war and many have tried to set out what those principles ought to be—commentators, Secretaries of Defense, Presidents—both present and former. A consensus seems to have been arrived at that we should go to war when our vital interests are at stake in a way that the majority of Americans have identified and are agreed upon, and when we have exhausted all peaceful alternatives that could have achieved the same goals as war. That is not, Mr. President, the situation that exists today, and we know it.

To those of us for whom Vietnam remains much more than just a distant memory, there are analogies which create deep-seated doubts over the apparent willingness of this Administration's rush to war. Let me say right up front that the Iraqi crisis is in most ways not like Vietnam.

It is very different indeed—different in International implications—different in purposes—different in risks—different in stakes—different in military strategy and opportunities. I am convinced also that it will be different in outcome.

But in one inescapable and absolutely critical facet, it demands that one of the central lessons of the Vietnam experience be applied—do not commit U.S. forces to combat in a potentially prolonged or bloody conflict unless Americans have reached a consensus on the need to do so. That consensus must be broad and openly arrived at with full respect for the constitutional role of the Congress—not by unilateral action of the President, absent true consultation.

There is a rush to war here. I do not know why, but there is a rush to war. There is a rush to have this thing over with. Somehow I can not help but feel that if we were squared off against a stronger nation there would not be such a rush. Our history with the Soviet Union makes that clear. But with Iraq—we know we can win or think we know we can win. We know they are surrounded. We know our high-technology weapons and targeting capabilities can overwhelm the Iraqi military. And so we think we can get it over with an "acceptable level of casualties."

So we are willing to act, it seems,

with more bravado than patience. It is as if the whole theory of deterrence developed through the cold war period has suddenly been turned topsy-turvy; and we are behaving precisely in such a confrontational manner because we are not facing a superpower and because the same rules of deterrence do not apply. That, I think, is not the way a great and responsible nation should act in these dangerous times, particularly not when it has other options available to it. But, most important, that is not the way you act if truly acting within the definition of a new world order.

In recent days we have heard some try to cower those with legitimate concerns or questions into political submission by suggesting that we are weakening the country or pulling the rug out from under the President with this debate or an adverse vote. I believe it is those who make that argument who do a disservice to country and to Constitution, and perhaps even to the troops.

I believe we strengthen our country through this debate because we show the world what real democracy means. And, more importantly, we strengthen our country because our citizens see our own democratic process working as it ought to. But most importantly, consider what a farce we would be perpetrating if the U.S. Congress did not exercise an independent judgement about war. Are we in the United States of America supposed to go to war simply because the President thinks we should and has put so many people in the position of having to support him just to back him up? Is that the reason we go to war in 1991 in the United States of America?

I hear it from person after person—"Well, I want to back up the President." "I do not want the President to look bad." "The President got us in this position, I am uncomfortable—but I can not go against him."

Mr. President, it looks to me like backing up the President's decision has become the new vital interest, not the immediate liberation of Kuwait—not some real threat to our country.

It sounds like we are risking war for pride, not for vital interests!

Are we supposed to go to war simply because one man—the President—makes a series of unilateral decisions that put us in a box—a box that makes that war, to a greater degree, inevitable? Are we supposed to go to war because once the President has announced something publicly, to reverse or question him is somehow detrimental to the Nation despite the fact we are a coequal partner in government?

Obviously, such an argument and such an approach to the governing process of this country makes Congress nothing more than a rubber stamp and literally renders inoperative our coequal decisionmaking responsibility in a matter of war and peace. It might be wise to remind ourselves that we still are a nation of laws and not of men; that we still elect our Presidents. We do not crown them. We had a revolution more than 200 years ago to settle that question and the Constitution put the war-making power in Congress's hands precisely to avoid the very individual decisionmaking—that places us in the box we are told we are in today.

Mr. President, I suspect that 75 percent or more of those who will vote for use of force desperately do not want it to be used, and a significant number will vote for it only because they want to prevent the President from being reversed. That really means that this vote to grant the use of force may very well carry—if it does—only because some will succumb to the very box the President has put us in.

The danger of that is that those who vote for use of force will create a situation where it becomes more, rather than less, likely that the force they hope will not be used will, in fact, be used. They escalate the stakes. They narrow the box further. That is a terrible way to make policy, Mr. President, but it is an even more terrible way to go to war by any account. That is called rolling-the-dice policy; big rolling the dice. Perhaps it will work. There are many who suspect it might.

But, Mr. President, I would rather vote for good, prudent policy which would have the same good end result or which, if it ultimately brings you to war, it does so because there was no other option. I would rather vote for that than a roll-the-dice policy with all the attendant risks and questions about who fills the power vacuum in Iraq. What happens if we win? What happens with Israel? What happens for years to come to American businessmen trying to do business in the Middle East? All of those are unanswered questions, Mr. President, and I think the American people would prefer that we vote that way, too.

But now, because of the decision of the President of the United States, because he set a January 15 deadline, because he significantly increased the number of troops in the desert, turning from defense to offense unilaterally, we are in the position of either debating this issue and slowing the rush to war, or forever giving up our responsibility to decide whether or not this Nation goes to war. I believe we have a basic duty and a responsibility

to ask why the unilateral conversion of Desert Shield to Desert Sword now demands that, like lemmings marching to the sea, we must march off to war.

Many have argued in recent days that we must, by a large majority, vote to give the President the right to use force, because that is the best way to send the message to Saddam Hussein, and that only the threat of force, a new threat of force, will somehow give him that message.

Mr. President, I believe such thinking is dangerous, and I believe it is flawed because it requires us to surrender the most important responsibility of the Congress: The power to make war. This is not a vote about sending a message. That message was already on the table. This is a vote about whether or not to put ourselves in a smaller box where war may become more likely, whether it needs to or not, and where we will have nothing further to say about it.

For us in Congress now, this is not a vote about a message. It is a vote about war because whether or not the President exercises his power, we will have no further say after this vote. But voting to keep sanctions and diplomacy is not a vote against war if all other options fail because we continue to hold that lever in our hands.

I ask you, Mr. President, which is more prudent? The argument that this vote will somehow send Saddam Hussein a different message ignores the fact that from the outset there has already been a realistic force on the table and there remains a threat of force as long as the sanctions are in place and troops are in the region. So the decision is not a decision that sends some new threat of the use of force that somehow will accomplish what the last threat of force was unable to. It is a vote which says we are ready to go to war and it says we are ready to go to war before all the other options have been exercised. I, therefore, do not believe that we can treat this as somehow passing on to the President some casual affirmation of his diplomacy.

There is also the argument that we must support the President because he is the President, and if you do not support the President when he asks you to, you will hurt the policy. That is an argument of enormous appeal, Mr. President, and that is why it is made. All of us, I think, every single one of us by natural instinct wants to support the President. None of us wants to be perceived somehow as taking away from the ability of the President to act in the greater interest of the country. But regrettably the President has put us in a position where we have a choice between either blindly support-

ing him or destroying the strength of the constitutional process and risking a war simultaneously.

Sometimes this appeal of the President, political as it is, can trample on the duties and responsibilities of others that the Founding Fathers said share in the governing process. Mr. President, in all candor, I would rather be here on the floor voting to support the President. I would rather case a vote that tallies in the eighties or nineties or is unanimous and I can walk away without a sense of division. I can assure you it is easier, but if we were to succumb to this argument, if anybody in this Chamber succumbs to this argument right now, if we just close ranks with the President for the sake of closing ranks, we will effectively have given up our warmaking power, and we will set an extraordinarily dangerous precedent, and, most of all, we will not have done, I think, our service to the troops and to this country.

All the President would have to do at any time then, all any President would have to do is create a box, put the Congress in the box and then say, "I need you to close ranks around me," and he or she will unilaterally carry out whatever policy they want to in the name of unity. That argument cost us thousands of lives in Vietnam, Mr. President. Just go down to the memorial here in Washington and look at that black granite wall. I say to my colleagues that over half the names on that wall are there because too many legislators were too often too willing to just close ranks with the President.

The call we need to heed is not a call to close ranks with the President, but how about closing ranks with the troops in the Arabian desert whose fate is determined by our analysis and judgment? How about closing ranks with mothers and fathers and brothers and sisters and families across this country whose hearts and souls are heavy with the hope that we will exercise our judgment correctly? If there is a call to close ranks, Mr. President, let it be the closing of ranks among ourselves here in this Chamber with our responsibility to make our best judgment about how we deal with human life. That is what the Framers of the Constitution intended and that is what the American people expect of us.

We are in this position today because the President of the United States made a series of decisions that have put us in this position, not because we made them or because we fail to make them. The memory of Vietnam says to all of us that it is far, far better that we risk curbing in or reining in this rush to war now, rather

than trying to get the American people support it at some time down the road after the shooting has started. Nothing, nothing could faster bring us a repetition of the divisions and the torment this Nation faced during the 1960's and 1970's.

Mr. President, in my heart and in my gut and in my mind I do not believe in sending people to war unless it is imperative. And it is not, in my view, imperative that in the next few days we send soldiers to fight a war. We are at this grave moment deciding whether or not we do so for two fundamental reasons: Because President Bush unilaterally decided to increase the troops to 430,000 and because he set a deadline.

We are not here because oil is not reaching the shores of the United States or our economy is crippled.

We are not here because there has been an attack or there is the imminent threat of one.

We are not here because the world has decided that we have to go to war.

We are not here because the vital interests of the United States are somehow more at stake today than they will be in 3 weeks or 3 months or a year.

We are here because the policy of one man suggests that we do not have the patience to wait this out and see if we can settle it differently.

Much has been said by the Secretary of State and others about a New World order, about a defining moment in history. I have no doubt about the potential of this moment to be defining in terms of history, but that definition can be negative as well as positive. And how negative or positive it will be will depend on what kind of New World order we really create.

Can it truly be said that the United States of America, trading off better treatment to China for an abstention on a vote, cozying up to Syria with its record of support for terrorism, or making promises to other countries in exchange for a hold-your-coat, you-go-ahead-and-take-the-risks-and-casualties endorsement, can it truly be said that these create a New World order? Can it really be said that we are building a New World order when it is almost exclusively the United States who will be fighting in the desert, not alone, but almost, displaying pride and impatience and implementing what essentially amounts to a pax Americana? Is that a New World order?

Can it really be said that this is a true New World order when it lacks a true United Nations collective security effort, with the full measure of international cooperation and burden-sharing which it should carry?

Most who look at the financial burden we are incurring compared to our allies; who measure the number of forces we have who will shed blood in comparison to our allies; who take notice of the degree to which there are unilateral ultimatums issued by us; the unilateral offerings of meetings by us; the unilateral refusals of meetings by us; and U.N. Secretary General Perez de Cuellar nearly absent from the scene until these final moments—many who see these realities—cannot help but question the collectiveness of this security, the breadth of multilateralism in this cooperation, and especially the newness of this New World order.

Mr. President, I regret that I do not see a New World order in the United States going to war with shadow battlefield allies who barely carry a burden. It is too much like the many flags policy of the old order in Vietnam where other countries were used to try to mask the unilateral reality.

I see international cooperation; yes, I see acquiescence to our position; I see bizarre new bedfellows and alliances, but I question if it adds up to a new world order.

Most important, I do not see a new world order in fighting before we wait out more peaceful approaches. In fact, I see more of the old world order where countries are quick to try to resolve their disputes by force, where countries that do not try to exercise the patience for real international cooperative efforts—slow as they might be, become so locked in their position that common sense becomes one of the first casualty of conflict.

Some Senators and the administration have suggested that sanctions alone cannot force Saddam Hussein to withdraw from Kuwait. They note that sanctions can be evaded; that the alliance could break up, with Iran agreeing to pipe Iraqi oil or the Soviet Union suddenly shifting its support for our policy to opposition. They say now is the time to strike, while the alliance is strong. They suggest that the failure of sanctions is an obvious truth that the rest of us are willfully ignoring.

This obvious truth is contrary to the testimony of our own intelligence estimates. As CIA Director William Webster testified before the Congress just 1 month ago—on December 5, 1990—the CIA estimated that sanctions would need another 9 months to be effective—only then could we determine the extent to which they were working.

That means that according to the Director of the CIA, we cannot conclude that sanctions are ineffective until next September.

Other experts have suggested that the full impact of sanctions in degrading the Iraqi military, in addition to its civilian economy, would take some 2 years in all to be felt. By that time, they have testified, “the industrial infrastructure of the Iraqi economy will grind down for lack of spare parts, and factories will close for lack of raw materials.” As they have testified, “sanctions do not yield immediate results. They are not a surgical tool; rather their effect is corrosive.”

With the sanctions, time is not on Saddam Hussein's side. but ours. Sanctions cost Iraq much, they cost us little. Iraq's gross national product before the sanctions were imposed was \$52 billion a year—its exports were \$12.4 billion, almost entirely in oil, its imports another \$13 billion. Those exports are now wiped out; those imports are largely stopped. The grinding down has begun and will only intensify with time.

As a top-level member of the Bush administration told the New York Times and Washington Post on August 9, on the condition that he not be named, sanctions will work against Iraq because “we don't have the cold war situation where it was difficult to enforce sanctions because of ideological competition and huge divisions in the world. This time, we've got the Soviet Union on board and virtually everyone else as well. \* \* \* You can shut off the gulf and you've got them locked in on the Mediterranean side. \* \* \* This time we're dealing with a single-source economy based on oil sales that is on its knees working of the war and can be hurt very easily.”

As a former Iraqi army colonel told the Washington Post on August 23, “It's more important to stop the oil from getting out than to stop food from getting in.” If the oil doesn't get out, in time Saddam Hussein cannot pay for anything—let alone the huge military establishment that is bleeding his country's economy dry.

We sustained our fight against the Soviets for 40 years after Stalin took over Eastern Europe. We contained Stalinism, and in time, an isolated and decaying Soviet Union has been going through a process of caving in. Iraq, a far less powerful nation than the Soviets, will be ground down even more surely, and far more quickly, if we only have the patience to stay with our original policy.

I have heard Senators and others argue that coalition is weak or fragile and that we must move now before it falls apart. That says little for a New World order. The President says little for vital interests at stake.

I would suggest respectfully that every parent in America with a child in the desert must ask: If our allies, the coalitions, cannot stay the course of peace, then why should we be forced to run the course of war?

Some say look at how he survived a 7-year war with Iran. If he can do that, he will survive the sanctions. It is true, Saddam Hussein forced the Iraqi people to endure untold human sacrifice in the 8-year war he waged against Iran. However, there are major differences. During that war, it was Iran which was, for the most part, cut off from the outside world, not Iraq. And it was during that war, that the Soviet Union, France, China, the United States, and other Western nations provided Saddam Hussein the guns and butter to wage the campaign against Iran. Billions of dollars of aid flowed from the gulf state Arabs into Saddam Hussein's coffers.

Today, Saddam Hussein does not enjoy any of that luxury. The sanctions have effectively denied to Iraq foreign exchange earnings from oil. In addition, the sanctions have effectively cut off Saddam Hussein's military pipeline.

Each day—this is by CIA and all other observers' estimates—the sanctions are in place is a day in which Iraq's military capabilities undergo further degradation. Radars start breaking down; computers in aircraft, tanks and antiaircraft batteries blow. They cannot be replaced the same way ours can. A steady deterioration sets in that, with patience on our part, can leave the Iraqi military with a large number of personnel, but with an unreliable arsenal that cannot hold up in the heat of sustained battle.

As a former soldier, I would far rather exercise patience as a means of gaining the maximum military advantage possible, than to force a hasty confrontation which is almost certain to result in more body bags and casualties than we would have had to endure if such patience had been exercised. Those who want the President to have an unfettered hand may be willing to overlook this reality. But the hearings have shown that the American people are not.

Most amazingly, until November 8, the administration on numerous occasions urged the American people to be patient—that sanctions would take time to work. We were told that the economic sanctions would make Saddam Hussein's position untenable.

The August 9, 1990, New York Times carried an analytical piece quoting various administration sources that the economic embargo would cut off Iraq's supply of military spare parts and am-

munition, making it impossible to sustain long supply lines and perhaps eroding Hussein's political statutes at home.

A senior administration official was quoted as saying: "The embargo is the key." He, and other officials warned that it would take months for such a strategy to play out.

On September 5, 1990, Secretary of State James Baker, in testimony before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, stated:

Iraq's import-dependent economy is beginning to feel the strain, and international pressures will continue to grow over time as shortages mount.

The Secretary made a very important and unequivocal point:

Time is on the side of the international community. Diplomacy can be made to work.

The Secretary concluded his remarks by stating the administration believed:

\*\*\* this coordinated and comprehensive international isolation of Iraq is the only peaceful path to meeting objectives set by the President. Our efforts, however, will take time and that is what we ask most of the American people: Stand firm. Be patient. And remain united so that together we can show that aggression does not pay.

Thus, the fundamental question Congress is legitimately asking is why, all of a sudden, did all the talk of patience and time being on the side of the international community vanish so quickly? We have a right to still ask that question. To date, we have not received a believable explanation.

Mr. President, it has been said again and again on this floor but it bears repeating: You only go to war when it is imperative to protect vital national interests—when it is the last alternative available to you—when there is none other. Until we reach that point, no one should send our young people into battle to die.

Have we reached the point where we can tell the American people that there is no other moral choice but to send their sons and daughters, their husbands and wives, their grandchildren off to war in the Arabian Desert?

If ever there was a time to heed the counsel of former President Dwight D. Eisenhower, it is now. For in matters of war, President Eisenhower said that we have to have the courage of patience.

I would ask another question, Mr. President. I have not heard one single person within the administration suggest that somehow at this point in time we are losing this effort and Saddam Hussein is winning it. There is no one who suggests that Saddam Hussein is winning anything today. In fact, all we are told is, well, we do not

think the sanctions are going to drive him out of Kuwait.

But, tragically, we will never know the answer to whether or not they will drive him out, and some family that might lose a son will never know the answer of whether there was another way because we were not willing to find out whether that other way might work.

So if Iraq is not winning and we are not losing, Mr. President, then why the rush to send our men and women to war? What happened to the very patience that the President and Secretary of State Baker asked of the American people as a requirement necessary for the success of the President's policy?

The answer is regrettable I think. We are asked to authorize the President to go to war now, not because the President's original policy—which we all supported—has failed. We are asked to authorize war because the President put 430,000 troops in Saudi Arabia and it may be impossible to maintain them in a high state of readiness if they are not engaged soon.

There are other unanswered questions about this war. It will cost American money, it may damage our weakened economy further and its impact on energy prices is impossible to predict. But we should ask, can we really afford what we are possibly embarking on?

In the long run, such a war could lead to renewed terrorist attacks on Americans as a result of our having killed innumerable Arab civilians. Is America prepared? And what of the war's impact in the Middle East generally? What of the grave risks of new instabilities that could lead to still further wars, involving many nations in the region, including Israel. Is the liberation of Kuwait in a few days so imperative that all those risks are worthwhile at this moment?

As we approach this historic vote, we must ask ourselves the most important and fundamental question we are ever called upon to answer in good conscience; If it were my son, my daughter, or grandchildren, am I convinced that our Government has done everything possible, short of war, to bring about the outcome we all desire?

Did our leaders exercise enough patience. And if it were my son, or daughter, or grandchild, killed in battle on January 16, or February 16, or March or April, would I firmly believe in my own mind that the sacrifice was justified because vital national interests were at stake and all others options, short of war, had been painstakingly and patiently exhausted.

This question is fundamental to why we are here today, exercising our constitutional responsibility in deciding whether or not to authorize one man—the President—to go to war.

Mr. President, it seems to me that pride and Presidential prestige have far more to do with this vote than the vital interests of the United States.

I am well aware of the dangers of Saddam Hussein to the region and the long-term danger of his arsenal—of nuclear, chemical, biological weapons. But I did not know the United States was in the habit of fighting preemptive wars and, more important, the constant references to Saddam Hussein being a future threat have nothing to do with the U.N. resolutions. Nowhere in the resolution has the United Nations ever agreed to or referred the use of all necessary means to somehow solve the long-term problem.

For students of history there is skepticism about a war solving that anyway. Yes, Saddam Hussein may die. And you may temporarily obliterate the warmaking power against Israel or other states in the region. But as long as the United States, China, the Soviet Union, France, Germany, and others sell weapons and arm the region, the next despot to replace Saddam Hussein will once again build the capacity for war unless there is attention to real peacemaking in the region. Moreover, if we have a war, a predominantly U.S. war, the enmity that will build up will last beyond any of our lifetimes, the hatred that will fester will replace the weapons of today until that hatred is allied with the weapons of tomorrow and they will seek revenge.

We should again heed the words of the great conservative Edmund Burke when he said "A conscientious man would be cautious about how he dealt in blood."

I end my comments coming back to where I began: Are we ready for what this country and our countrymen will witness and bear? Have we come to the moment, each of us, with the values and interests at stake to call on each of us to send our own children to die?

I come back to my plea that we balance the risks of continuing sanctions and making clear to Saddam Hussein that force is a future possibility against the human considerations of today, against the gravity of what we will do to others, and what will certainly be done to all too many of our own.

It is hard sometimes, Mr. President, to measure fully what that means when we talk about what will happen to them and what will happen to us. I

am prepared to accept the consequences of a war should it be absolutely vital and necessary. But the vote here at this point in time is really a vote about what we will accept. All the personal things that will happen to people because none of the others at this point are paramount.

I would like to share with my colleagues something that Dalton Trumbo wrote in a book called "Johnny Got His Gun." It was written after World War I.

Yes, there was an enormous passivism in the air at that time. That is not what we are talking about here. But, nevertheless, what he faced and put before the world then, is relevant today. It is a question about what happens to people. He wrote about a young soldier who went to war who ended up losing his arms, legs, sight, hearing, his smell, his capacity to speak.

After years of lying in a hospital, he finally figured out how to tap his head in Morse code and finally somebody heard his message. Thinking that somehow he might be able to go out in the world and be of use by being a spectacle of what war does, he suggested that they let him out in a glass box for people to see. And among the places he suggested he go was a place like this.

Dalton Trumbo wrote the following:

He would be doing good too in a round-about way. He would be an educational exhibit. People wouldn't learn much about anatomy from him but they would learn all there was to know about war. That would be a great thing to concentrate war in one stump of a body and to show it to people so they could see the difference between a war that's in newspaper headlines and liberty loan drives and a war that is fought out lonesomely in the mud somewhere a war between a man and a high explosive shell.

\* \* \* \* \*

Take me wherever there are parliaments and diets and congresses and chambers of statesmen. I want to be there when they talk about honor and justice and making the world safe for democracy and fourteen points and the self determination of peoples. I want to be there to remind them I haven't got a tongue to stick into the cheek I haven't got either. But the statesmen have tongues. The statesmen have cheek. Put my glass case upon the speaker's desk and every time the gavel descends let me feel its vibration through my little jewel case. Then let them speak of trade policies and embargoes and new colonies and old grudges. Let them debate the menace of the yellow race and the white man's burden and the course of empire \* \* \*. Let them form blocs and alliances and mutual assistance pacts and guarantees of neutrality. Let them draft notes and ultimatums and protests and accusations.

But before they vote on them before they give the order for all the little guys to start killing each other let the main guy rap his gavel on my case and point down at me and say here gentlemen is the only issue before this house and that is are you for this thing here or are you against it.

That is the only issue before this body.

JOHN KERRY  
MASSACHUSETTS

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
Dear Mr. Connarton:

Thank you for contacting me on behalf of the City of Cambridge to express your opposition to the Bush Administration's early use of military force by the United States against Iraq. I was pleased to find out that the citizens of Cambridge have chosen to actively voice their views on the issue of when and how this nation goes to war.

As you know, on January 11, 1991, I voted in favor of a resolution that would have insisted that economic sanctions be given more time to work and against a resolution giving the President immediate authority to go to war against Iraq to force it out of Kuwait, warning that a decision to go to war was "rolling the dice" with our future. I am enclosing a copy of the speech I gave in the Senate expressing my belief that sanctions should have been given more time, and that we were unnecessarily risking American lives by going to war now.

Thank you again for expressing your concern and be assured that, in the weeks to come, I will continue to work toward the earliest possible resolution of the Gulf Crisis and restoration of peace in the Gulf.

Sincerely,



John F. Kerry  
United States Senator

JFK/bgc

1. S-263  
CONSENT  
COMMUNICATION

Comm. from Senator John F. Kerry  
regarding the resolution sent by the  
City Council in opposition to the war in  
Iraq.

In City Council,

February 11, 1991

*Placed on file*