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this posture of preparedness is also not consistent with the logistical realities of U.S. war preparations. The U.S. government has withheld this WMD intelligence through months of the build-up. It is much more likely Mr. Secretary-General, that my government is recalcitrant in its cooperation with UNMOVEC for purposes of its own and not the best interest of the People of America and the World.

The Armamentarium of Peace

I believe that UNMOVEC is a brave and partially successful addition to the armamentarium of peace. From a risk/cost-benefit point of view, it is a very promising investment. Mr. Annan, I urge you to join with me and millions of people of conscience around the world, in demanding - yet again - that the United States Government share real, high quality WMD intelligence [if it has any] with UNMOVEC.

Respectully yours,

Philip R. Fenstermacher

----- End forwarded message -----

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Drury, Margaret

From: fensterm@fas.harvard.edu
Sent: Thursday, March 13, 2003 2:48 PM
To: Drury, Margaret
Cc: choffman@ci.cambridge.ma.us
Subject: Fwd: Riskonomics of WMD Intelligence

To the Honorable, the City Council;

I sent the following to the Secretary General, the Security Council, the new York Times, and the Mr. Bush. It will probably die on staff desks. If you find merit in the argument, and feel that it would help the discussion in the Security Council, could you help me get it there?

Regards,

Philip R. fenstermacher

17 Rowell St. #1
Dorchester, MA 02125
fensterm@fas.harvard.edu
pfenstermacher@earthlink.net

----- Forwarded message from fensterm@fas.harvard.edu -----
Date: Thu, 13 Mar 2003 10:14:43 -0500
From: fensterm@fas.harvard.edu
Reply-To: fensterm@fas.harvard.edu
Subject: Riskonomics of WMD Intelligence
To: annan@un.org

Mr. Secretary-General

I believe that my government has misrepresented the reasons for withholding WMD intelligence from UNMOVEC, There is a risk/cost associated with releasing U.S. data to the Commission, but it is surely recoverable.

No Intelligence is Good Forever

Intelligence always loses value with time. Things get moved for routine maintenance as well as attempts at concealment. In the case of Iraq, the military surely has an idea of the effectiveness Of U.S. KeyHole satellites, since my government shared data with them prior to the war with Iran. Iraqi WMD's, if they exist, are surely moved regularly whether UNMOVEC has been told of them or not. U.S. intelligence of any Iraqi WMD's must and surely is regularly updated.

No Damage to U.S. Intelligence is Forever

Were Dr. Blix and his people to compromise intelligence provided by the U.S., it would require time for U.S. Intelligence to recover. I submit to you sir that the time involved would be at most weeks and not months. Furthermore, the U.S. would know which sites it had given to Dr. Blix. It could therefore focus intelligence effort on those sites and achieve verification of its intelligence. It might also be able to learn something about the methods of evasion used [if any]. In some cases, a suspicious looking burial sites could be cofirmed to be malignant if they are dug up. Giving more data to UNMOVEC could conceivably improve U.S. intelligence.

There is only one case in which a temporary loss of WMD intelligence would be potentially damaging to my government - if it is maintaining preparedness for a pre-emptive war ON ANY GIVEN DAY. I'm sure the Department of Defense thinks it must know where the WMD's are so that it can neutralize them in the initial strike. While I find the idea of pre-emptive war unacceptable in and of itself,

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Communication #12

A communication was received
from Philip R. Fenstermacher,
regarding riskonomics of WMD
intelligence.

In City Council March 17, 2003

PLACED ON FILE.